Many college and university 403(b) plans restrict the menu of investment choices to funds offered by TIAA-CREF, the current manager of over half of all 403(b) contributions. Further, in the face of Internal Revenue Code changes that will take effect in 2006 and will make 403(b) plan ERISA compliance more difficult, some sponsors are dropping their existing alternatives to TIAA-CREF. Using eight years of historical performance data, we study the efficiency of the TIAA-CREF opportunity set relative to a somewhat larger set that includes several standard index funds, and we estimate the lifetime opportunity losses to participants who are constrained to invest only in TIAA-CREF. Based on efficient frontier analysis, and assuming optimal rebalancing by a loss-averse individual as time to retirement approaches, our analysis demonstrates that the opportunity losses are economically significant. Depending on lossaversion, and diversification constraints, over a forty-year work-life an employee who is restricted to TIAA-CREF would lose approximately half of terminal wealth, compared to investing in the expanded menu that includes index funds. Moreover, limiting the choices to TIAA-CREF does not appear to help even unsophisticated investors. TIAA-CREF equity funds offer little meaningful diversification and are no less risky than the alternative index funds. Even when a naïve diversification strategy of equally-weighting (1/n) all available funds is applied, the expanded menu outperforms the restricted portfolio by about 26 percent over the employee's work-life. The findings have direct implications for the over 6.8 million enrollees in 403(b) plans, who currently make around $27 billion in annual contributions, and indirect implications for the much larger population of 401(k)-type defined contribution plans. 
What's in Your 403(b)? Academic Retirement Plans and the Costs of Underdiversification
Most faculty members and other employees of non-profit colleges and universities, along with workers at other non-profit organizations, can participate in 403(b) tax deferred retirement plans.
1 Typically, these plans provide for a "mandatory" annual contribution that is specified as a percentage of the employee's base salary, and may also provide for voluntary contributions by the employee, through salary reduction agreements. Of these 100 leading educational institutions, 92 offer TIAA-CREF for both the mandatory employer's contribution and any supplemental employee contributions. The other eight, including six University of California campuses, offer defined benefit plans. 4 All 50 of the leading liberal arts colleges offer TIAA-CREF. For five universities and 29 colleges, TIAA-CREF is the only option for the mandatory contribution. Schools that provide alternatives to TIAA-CREF generally offer one or two different manager choices.
Most commonly, these alternatives are mutual funds that are managed by Vanguard, Fidelity, or both. Supplemental contribution options generally offer somewhat more choice--all 100 universities and colleges offer a defined contribution option and the numbers offering Vanguard and/or Fidelity are somewhat higher than for the employer's contribution.
Limiting the investment options to TIAA-CREF is tempting. TIAA-CREF has provided retirement savings investment vehicles to colleges and universities for many years, offers a number of investment options, offers to provide "free" monitoring of its investment vehicles, and offers to assist colleges and universities in meeting newly required 403(b) plan documentation requirements. TIAA-CREF reports that they have more than 3.2 million participants and more than $300 billion of assets under management in 2003. 5 This total represents over 56 percent of all 403(b) assets under management, as estimated by the Investment Company Institute. 6 Even when the choices are not restricted to TIAA-CREF, it appears that many university employees nonetheless select only TIAA-CREF to manage their retirement investments.
7 4 The other public universities generally offer employees a choice between a defined benefit plan and the defined contribution choices noted in Table 1 . Figure 15 . 7 For example, among the colleges that comprise the Claremont Consortium, which offered Vanguard and Fidelity as options for many years for either the employee's contribution or for both, 84 percent of faculty members who were able to select alternatives, nonetheless, invested only through TIAA-CREF. Those who selected other managers tended to be members of the economics faculties who have expertise in finance
In this paper, we examine the wisdom of fiduciary decisions to require employees to concentrate their 403(b) wealth in the ten investment vehicles that are managed by TIAA-CREF. The analysis is timely, as recent mutual fund scandals, and changes in the Internal Revenue Code have caused a number of plan sponsors to re-examine the set of investment options that they make available to participating employees.
Using eight years of historical performance data, we compare the achievable performance of portfolios comprised exclusively of TIAA-CREF variable annuity funds to those that combine TIAA-CREF with a limited menu of index mutual funds. We find that, despite the number of variable annuity funds it offers, the TIAA-CREF menu provides little actual diversification of equity choices, compared to what can be achieved by adding selected index funds. While both the TIAA-CREF menu and the expanded menu are capable of achieving similar levels of total portfolio risk, over the eight years, the expanded portfolio offered substantially higher achievable performance than the TIAA-CREF funds.
Over a typical work-life, our analysis suggests that an employee could achieve roughly twice the level of retirement wealth by using the expanded menu, as compared to the menu limited to TIAA-CREF variable annuity funds. This conclusion is based on optimal rebalancing as time to retirement approaches and holds over a broad range of risk tolerance levels. Finally, we compare the lifetime performance of a naïve diversification strategy of equally-weighting all available investment vehicles and find that, even by this approach, the expanded menu outperformed the portfolio limited to TIAA-CREF instruments by a factor of roughly 1.5.
The 403(b) Environment
In 403(b) plans, as with analogous for-profit 401(k) plans, the plan sponsor (the employer) generally offers a menu of vehicles in which retirement savings may be invested. Each employee often is responsible for allocating retirement savings account across the menu of investment vehicles. The menu of permitted investment vehicles can include annuity contracts offered by life insurance companies ("insurance contracts") and variable annuity or non-variable annuity mutual funds ("funds") and can be different for the employer's mandatory contribution than for the employee's voluntary contribution.
The nexus of compliance requirements of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") have given rise to a challenging legal landscape for 403(b) plan sponsors. In addition to compliance issues, sponsors face sources of potential litigation arising in the wake of recent mutual fund scandals and litigation over the Enron retirement plan, among others.
The most imminent concern is the change in the IRC that will take effect after December 31, 2005. In contrast to previous years, where a number of plan sponsors assumed ERISA compliance was not required, under new code the presumption is that non-government-sponsored and non-church-sponsored 403(b) plans must be ERISA compliant. This means that sponsors must develop a formal plan document, provide for universal participation among employees, and provide monitoring of fund performance.
The IRC requirement of "universal participation" by employees, rather than the previous requirement of "substantial participation," may be a challenging standard to meet for some employers. A commonly expressed view is that, to get 404(c) protection, a sponsor must offer a broad range of investment alternatives that in aggregate enable a participant to achieve a portfolio with aggregate risk and return characteristics that are within the range normally appropriate for the participant. The Preamble to Section 404 states that the fiduciary is responsible for (1) determining the asset classes to be offered, so that participants can create diversified portfolios that balance return and risk, (2) selecting, and (3) making sure that the options continue to be appropriate. 8 Thus, it appears that a sponsor can be subject to fiduciary liability if either the set of available asset classes is too narrow to permit efficient diversification or if the set of specific investment vehicles includes options that are not appropriate because, for example, their fees are not competitive.
One prominent concern of plan sponsors is the potential for class-action liability arising from employer involvement in determining and monitoring the investment choices that are offered to employees. 9 One implication of the new IRC and application of ERISA requirements is that plan sponsors respond by restricting fund choice, perhaps as a way to accommodate the growth in number of participants and to economize on monitoring and related expenses. However, while the employers may reduce out-ofpocket expense with such a response, the opportunity costs for employees may be large.
The employers appear to be caught in a Catch-22: If they offer more choices, they cannot be faulted for failing to offer opportunities for optimal diversification or for implicitly giving investment advice. However, if an employee, who is faced with many choices, concentrates investments in narrow and risky asset classes, the sponsor may be subject to litigation based on the sponsor's failure to withhold investment choices that enable an employee to take excessive risk. Conversely, if the permitted set of investment vehicles is overly restricted, asset classes that are important for achieving good investment performance may be excluded, exposing the sponsor to the potential for litigation based on underperformance.
The ERISA requirement that the sponsor monitor the investment vehicles adds to the challenge of finding the right balance. Monitoring is not costless or perfect. Hence, the larger the number of permitted investment vehicles, the greater is the sponsor's annual cost of monitoring and the greater is the risk of a legal challenge based on the argument that the monitoring effort was defective with regard to a particular investment vehicle. are restricted to invest deferred compensation only in funds managed by TIAA-CREF.
The Economic Significance of Defined Contribution Plan Investing
To assess the opportunity loss of restricting the asset choices in this way, we introduce the possibility to invest in a menu of index funds. We limit the analysis to index funds in order to focus only on the benefits of diversification across asset classes and because index funds are relatively easy to monitor. We selected funds managed by Vanguard because it has the longest history of managing index funds and low expense ratios, and is available in many 403(b) plans. 17 We refer to the opportunity set that is limited to TIAA-CREF as "TIAA-CREF Only;" to an alternative opportunity set that is limited to
Vanguard index funds as "Vanguard Only;" and to the combined opportunity set as "TIAA-CREF + Vanguard." Based on the efficient frontiers for TIAA-CREF Only,
Vanguard Only, and TIAA-CREF + Vanguard, we estimate expected long-run returns to portfolios that are optimized to maximize expected return subject to risk.
To examine the effects of risk aversion on optimal portfolios, we employ a lossavoidance value-at-risk ("VAR") methodology that is based on achieving at least the same return as investment in a money market fund. The VAR methodology, in addition to being easier to apply than utility-theory-based risk aversion models, produces results that are intuitive and are broadly consistent with the advice given to individuals by investment management professionals, and with the actual portfolio decisions of individuals. We consider a range of tolerances for VAR and determine how the employee's optimal portfolio composition changes annually as the employee approaches retirement. We then use the annually rebalanced portfolios to estimate the expected value at retirement of a one-dollar per year investment in the optimal portfolio.
17 Except for expense ratio differences, investing in similar indexes offered by other mangers, such as Fidelity, would not materially affect the results.
Data
TIAA-CREF offers nine retirement investment funds in addition to its annuity insurance product, the TIAA Traditional Annuity. These funds are listed in Table 2 , along with information on each fund's date of initiation, investment style, sector focus, and investment objective. Because the TIAA Traditional Annuity is an insurance contract, there is no direct link between investment performance of underlying assets and TIAA-CREF's promised payments to contract holders. 18 Accordingly, we are unable to include the performance of the Traditional Annuity in the analysis. In addition, assets in this account may only be transferred to other accounts over a ten-year period making it difficult for an individual to rebalance to the optimal portfolio over time. Were we able to do so, the addition could affect our conclusions quantitatively, especially for performance of invested assets in the few years shortly before retirement (when purchasing the Traditional Annuity is most likely to be warranted), but would not alter our qualitative conclusions. Estate fund. When we allow for the inclusion of the TIAA Real Estate account it is specifically noted. However, any results from the inclusion of this account must be interpreted with caution due to the likely bias in our risk estimates.
In addition to the TIAA-CREF funds, Table 2 We also retrieved data on the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund. We compared the returns on this fund to those of the CREF Money Market fund and found no material differences in realized returns or risk. Accordingly, we include only the CREF fund in our analysis. When we examine the Vanguard Only opportunity set, the CREF Money Market Fund is used as a proxy for the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund. 21 In a study of investment choices available to 401(k) plans, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) base their analysis on plans where available funds had at least 5 years of historical data. Because Vanguard added several fund alternatives in the five to eight year range from the time of our study, and generally is quicker than TIAA-CREF to add new funds, our analysis may underestimate the incremental value of including Vanguard index funds among the available asset classes.
REIT index is invested in market assets and is not managed by an insurance company, it is an eligible vehicle for deferred compensation investing.
We retrieved TIAA-CREF fund performance data directly from the TIAA-CREF annualized expected return rate is derived by compounding the monthly return. 22 The results in the figure are based on monthly returns, which is the interval used throughout the analysis.
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Although we use the longest feasible consistent sample period, the expected return estimates may not be representative. In particular, as interest rates generally were declining over the period, longer-term bond funds may have realized unexpectedly positive performance. Also, the sample period includes the end of the emerging market rally, the Asian stock market collapse, the end of the dot-com rally, and the effects of 9-11. While these factors probably affected the optimized allocations to specific investment funds, they are less likely to have materially affected allocations across broad asset classes. 22 We use return rates computed as: (p i+1 -p i ) / p i . 23 Because some of the assets in certain TIAA-CREF funds are not marked to market daily, possibly resulting in autoregressive error and low estimates of correlation across funds, we compared daily, monthly, and quarterly performance. While there is little evidence that daily data result in biased estimates of variance, there is evidence that correlations across funds are understated by daily data.
It is noteworthy that, based on the results in Figure 1 , restricting the set of investment choices to only TIAA-CREF does not appear to limit the ability of employees to take on high risk by investing in only one asset class. The fund in Figure 1 with the highest measured risk over our sample period was the CREF Growth Fund, which also had the second lowest realized return over the eight-year period. As the realized return on this fund was less than the return on the CREF Money Market Fund, the CREF Growth fund had a negative Sharpe Ratio over the sample period.
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Figure 2 is a plot of the indexed values of eight representative asset classes over the period of our study. The figure reflects the effects of market-wide phenomena discussed above, and also illustrates that the price movements of a number of the more risky broad asset classes are highly correlated. Global). The correlations among all five are always at least 0.93, and frequently much higher. Thus, it appears that the investor's ability to diversify using these five CREF funds is only slightly better than if just one of the five were available. The same five 24 The ratio was developed by Bill Sharpe to measure risk-adjusted performance. It is calculated by subtracting the risk free rate from the rate of return for a portfolio and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the portfolio returns. 25 The CREF Social Choice fund and the Vanguard Balanced fund, while they have high correlations with pure equity funds, have lower risk because they combine equity and debt.
Diversification
funds also are highly correlated with four of the Vanguard funds (Balanced Index, 500
Index, Growth Index and Total Stock Index).
Correlations also are consistently above 0.90 among the four Vanguard bond funds (Total Bond Index, Short-term Bond Index, Intermediate-term Bond Index, and
Long-term Bond Index) and with the CREF Bond fund. Based on the correlation evidence in Table 3 , Vanguard's foreign equity funds, the CREF Inflation-Protected
Bond fund, the real estate funds, and Vanguard Small Cap Index add the most to potential diversification. for the funds comprising the portfolio. 27 The greater the diversification benefit of less than perfect positive correlation across funds, the lower will be the portfolio standard deviation compared to the average for the underlying funds. For this analysis, balanced funds and similar hybrids are classified as equity. The figure demonstrates that, because of the high correlations across TIAA-CREF's five equity funds, the aggregate benefit of diversification, using the naïve equal-weighting strategy, is to reduce portfolio risk by less than five percent. The result is similar for Vanguard's domestic equity index funds, but improves by the addition of international equities. Combining debt and equity funds materially improves diversification, but at the sacrifice of the higher expected returns that 26 These portfolios are variants of the "1/n Strategy," where n is the number of assets in the portfolio. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002) find that investors tend to use the 1/n rule. 27 These percentages are computed as, (Port. Std. Dev./Avg. Std. Dev.), where (1/n x Avg. Var. + ((n-1)/n) x Ave. Cov.)^.5 is the portfolio standard deviation an n is the number of funds that are equally weighted in the portfolio.
equity historically has afforded. 28 Inclusion of the Vanguard REIT Fund adds still more diversification benefits, but potentially without sacrificing expected return. While the figure shows the greatest diversification benefit when TIAA Real Estate is included, the benefit is likely to be overstated due to lack of regular marking to market of the real estate assets.
Efficient Frontiers
The efficient frontier of a set of risky assets is defined as the maximum expected return for any given level of risk. As a way of assessing the asset allocation choices that are available to plan participants, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) propose that the set of options should enable a person whose only wealth is in the plan to reach the same frontier as if a "reasonable set of alternatives were available." To operationalize the concept of a "reasonable set," they rely on Elton Gruber and Blake (1999), who find the following eleven indexes capture most risk and return differences across funds: six domestic equity indexes (value or growth combined with small, mid, or large capitalization); a general bond index; a mortgage-backed index, a high-yield index; an international bond index; and the MSCI EAFE international stock index. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) do not include real estate because most plans they studied did not offer a real estate fund.
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2004) Because the sample period is limited to eight years, the optimization routine may over-or under-weight certain investment instruments based on anomalous performance over the sample period. Also, because investors generally are likely to seek some degree of diversification of their holdings, the dotted lines in the figures show frontiers that are generated with an additional constraint that mandates a degree of diversification. More specifically, except for the CREF Money Market fund (which is unconstrained), we constrain the maximum investment in any one fund to not exceed the greater of 3/n or 30 percent, where n is the number of eligible investment funds other than money. Thus, for TIAA-CREF Only, the maximum is 3/7 or 42.9 percent, whereas for Vanguard Only and TIAA-CREF + Vanguard, the maximum is 30 percent. Because the constraint is applied at the individual fund level, it still is possible for an investor to heavily weight a broad asset class by investing in multiple funds in the same class.
29 Due to estimation and round-off error, this occasionally leads to a covariance matrix that is not positive semi-definite. To avoid this, we preconditioned the covariance matrix before calling frontcon. To do this, we expressed C as C=VDV' where V is an orthogonal matrix and D is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of C along the diagonal. We then formed the diagonal matrix D*, equal to D except with negative diagonal elements of D replaced by zeros, and replaced C with C*=VD*V'. Although frontcon complained when C was not positive semi-definite, the frontiers it produced in those cases were indistinguishable from those produced with preconditioning. In panel (a), imposing the diversification constraints has a minor effect on the efficient frontier. Also, the panel illustrates the minor difference in achievable performance between the TIAA-CREF + Vanguard and Vanguard Only. At risk levels above 10 percent there is virtually no difference. This is because at high risk levels the optimal portfolios do not include any of the TIAA-CREF funds. Note, however, that even these risk levels are low in relative terms, when compared to single asset classes.
As Figure 2 shows, all of the equity-only funds have risk levels during the sample period that are greater than 20 percent. Figure 4 tells a somewhat different story. Here, the TIAA Real Estate fund is included as an eligible asset. The result, over our sample period is that low-risk portfolios are invested heavily in this fund. Based on the realized statistics, in TIAA-CREF Only, taking risk levels beyond about 1.5 percent appears to add almost nothing to expected return. 
Panel (b) of

Projected Long-run Relative Performance of Optimized Portfolios
As a step toward assessing the long-run effects of the differences in efficient frontiers, in Figure 5 we compound the expected annual return over investment horizons ranging from ten to forty years. For highly loss-averse investment positions, such as an annual standard deviation of two percent, there is little sensitivity to restrictions on the set of investment choices, even for long investment horizons. However, for any given restricted set of investment choices, the expected terminal value of an initial investment of one dollar increases substantially. At higher risk levels but relatively short investment horizons, such as a 14 percent annualized standard deviation for ten years, the differences in terminal values across restrictions on investment choices are not large. When the investment horizon is long and the 14 percent annualized standard deviation is selected, the restriction on investment choices can have a substantial effect.
Based on expected annual returns, an employee who worked one year, had $4,000 invested in a deferred compensation plan that was limited to the TIAA-CREF funds other than the CREF Real Estate fund, who limited the maximum investment in any fund to a maximum of 42.9 percent, and who invested with a risk level of 14 percent, would be expected to have an ending value of retirement savings of $87,000. Had the individual invested in TIAA-CREF + Vanguard or in Vanguard Only, with a maximum of 30 percent in any fund, the expected ending value of retirement savings would instead be $250,700, an ending value that is 2.88 times as high as with TIAA-CREF Only. Table 4 shows portfolio asset allocations across broad asset classes: money, equity, debt, and real estate. 30 Regardless of the set of available investment vehicles, the lowest level of risk is achieved by investing only in money market funds. Conversely, at risk levels of 4.0 percent or more, the percent of assets invested in the CREF Money Market fund is always zero. Irrespective of which set of investment vehicles is considered and whether allocations to specific funds are constrained or not, at risk levels up to a 6.0 percent annualized standard deviation of returns, the predominant asset class is debt.
Asset Allocation by Portfolio Risk Level
In our data, at 14.0 percent, the highest risk level we consider, the optimizer selects the Vanguard REIT fund. While unconstrained allocations to the Vanguard REIT fund are very high, the diversification constraint limits this investment to 30 percent of all assets. As discussed above, real estate is excluded from the TIAA-CREF Only portfolios.
At intermediate risk levels and high levels of risk, normally 8.0 to 14.0 percent, when investments on real estate are constrained to be no more than either 30 percent or zero, the predominant investment class is equity.
For the TIAA-CREF + Vanguard set of portfolio options, Table 4 
The Effects of Risk Aversion and Investment Horizon on Asset Allocation
How much risk should employees accept? The answer depends on a multitude of individual-specific, intangible, and unobservable factors, on time to retirement, and on the marginal effects of greater risk on expected return. Siegel (1994) shows that with longer horizons, mean-variance maximizers would invest more, if not all, in stocks. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) find that a 50-50 allocation between equity and debt is plausible for myopic loss-averse investors. They observe that in consumption-based asset-pricing models this allocation requires an extremely high level of risk aversion and that with long investment horizons, allocations entirely in equity are plausible. 32 Ballente and Green (2004) and others also note that risk aversion may change with age. These theoretical results are broadly consistent with the rule-of-thumb advice of investment practitioners, that the fraction of an individual's portfolio that is allocated to equity should be around 100 minus the individual's age.
In this subsection we employ a value-at-risk ("VAR") approach to assess the effects of risk aversion that is manifested as loss avoidance and we explicitly take account of the effects of investment horizon on the selected risk level. We then are able to assess how the optimal mix of portfolio weights can be expected to evolve over time as the employee approaches retirement. We also use the analysis to estimate the cumulative value of deferred compensation investments in portfolios that are annually re-weighted to account for the investment horizon.
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To make loss avoidance operational, we define VAR as the probability that a risky portfolio will return less than the return from investing in the CREF Money Market fund. Because money market returns normally are only slightly higher than expected inflation, our approach to VAR is essentially a "preservation of principal" criterion that is specified in real terms. The analytical framework we use implies that, at some point, the employee converts the retirement portfolio to a riskless life annuity. 34 The investment 32 See Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) for a general review of economic theory related to age and horizon effects on asset allocation. 33 While investment professionals commonly advise reviewing portfolio allocations frequently and adjusting the allocations in response to changes in circumstances, market values, and investment options, Samulson and Zeckhauser (1988) and others document a "status quo bias" of not rebalancing very often, even in response to fluctuating asset values. 34 Poterba and Wise (1996) note that, in simple life-cycle models, with actuarially fair market values, individuals should annuitize all wealth at retirement, but that under more realistic assumptions the practice may not be optimal.
horizon is defined relative to when this point is expected to occur, which may be at the time of retirement. To the extent that an individual does not elect to convert, our portfolio optimization algorithm would yield an overly conservative portfolio.
While the VAR approach can be challenged as overly simple, because it does not take account of the entire distribution of returns, that concern is mitigated by the fact that the portfolios we focus on all have underlying risk and return properties that are driven by market forces. In addition, in contrast to utility-based models of risk aversion, the VAR approach implies changes in portfolio allocations that are broadly consistent with practice. While Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) find no evidence of gradual reduction in equity as age increases, they do observe a tendency for people to shift completely out of equity around the time of retirement. More specifically, when they examine equity ownership by age, they find that equity ownership profiles are flat over 25 to 55 years of age, and negatively sloped over 56 to70 years. They find that the aggregate trend, rather than being due to smoothing over time, is due to increasing probability of not owning any equity in later years. They conjecture that the pattern they observe is not due to age effects, but to cohort effects. Poterba and Wise (1996) find support for the presence of cohort effects, in that the share of equities in 401(k) plans has increased in recent years.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) observe that portfolio holdings could be influenced by nontraded assets. Consistent with this, they find that people who are entrepreneurs (with large holdings of risky illiquid assets) tend to hold financial assets that are more liquid.
They also find that equity ownership decreases with age. Bodie and Crane (1997) use TIAA-CREF data and also find that equity percentage declines with age. They interpret their finding as being consistent with the recommendations of practitioners. Finally, Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) study 401(k) plans and find that age has negative effect on equity holdings of a magnitude that is close to the practitioners' rule of thumb for equity investment.
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In the VAR analysis, we consider three critical values, defined in terms of standard deviations from the mean expected return. A critical value of one standard deviation ("1 Sigma") corresponds to a relatively loss-tolerant individual, who, over the investment horizon, is willing to accept a probability of about 16 percent that the investment performance will be less than the performance of investing in the CREF Money Market fund. Factors that could contribute to higher risk tolerance could include holdings of other retirement assets, a two-income family, a reason to anticipate a low level of post-retirement consumption needs, etc. A critical value of two standard deviations ("2 Sigma") corresponds to an individual who is willing to accept a probability of about 2.5 percent that investment performance over the investment horizon will be less that that of the CREF Money Market fund. Finally, a critical value of three standard deviations corresponds to a relatively high level of loss aversion, a willingness to accept a probability of about 0.1 percent that the risky portfolio will underperform the CREF Money Market fund.
To implement the VAR criteria, if the critical value of returns for any risky portfolio is less than the expected return for investing in the CREF Money Market fund, we select the Money Market fund. If any risky portfolio has a critical value that is above the expected return on the Money Market fund, we accept the risky portfolio that has the highest expected return. Generally, consistent with the theoretical argument of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and the empirical finding of Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) , our approach results in selecting either the Money Market fund or the riskiest portfolio. However, there normally is a period of a few years, as the investment horizon approaches zero, over which the transition from high risk to Money Market occurs. The main exception arises when the opportunity set is TIAA-CREF Only. In that set, because the marginal return to bearing risk greater than 4.0 percent is low, the optimal strategy selects relatively low portfolio risk levels, even when the investor is highly loss tolerant and the investment horizon is long.
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The effect on the mix of broad asset classes of annually rebalancing the retirement portfolio as the investment horizon approaches zero, is presented in Vanguard is available, and the employee is loss tolerant (1 Sigma) and uses our diversification constraint, the riskiest portfolios that we consider, a 14.0 percent standard deviation, is selected until the individual's investment horizon reaches two years. At that point the optimal portfolio has a risk level of 10.0 percent, and at an investment horizon of one year, the optimal portfolio has a risk level of 4.0 percent.
In contrast, the loss-averse employee holds the riskiest portfolio until the investment horizon reaches ten years, then switches to a risk level of 12.0 percent for one year, followed by 10.0 percent for one year, 8.0 percent for one year, and 6.0 percent for 36 As shown in Table 5 , even the most risk tolerant investor never holds more than 46 percent equity (with 54 percent in debt), when constrained to invest only in TIAA-CREF funds. In contrast in TIAA-CREF's printed literature to 403(b) investors who do not have access to the TIAA Real Estate fund, TIAA-CREF presents a sample "Aggressive" portfolio that is invested 75 percent in CREF Stock and 25 percent in debt, and even its "Moderately Conservative" sample portfolio has 50 percent in CREF Stock. It appears that these sample portfolios would have underperformed our optimized allocations over our eight-year sample period. See RA ERISA CA 10/34.3E-703-CA (8/03).
one year. When the investment horizon reaches five years, the loss-averse investor switches to the CREF Money Market fund.
The transitions when the opportunity set is restricted to TIAA-CREF Only follow a similar pattern and timing, except that, as previously noted, the risky portfolio never has a risk level above 6.0 percent. The analysis in Table 5 is based on our discrete categorizations of investment portfolios with respect to risk and on TIAA-CREF funds excluding the TIAA Real Estate fund.
The Effects of Risk Aversion and Investment Horizon on Expected Return
We use annual rebalancing based on loss aversion and investment horizon to compute the expected long-run returns as functions of the opportunity set of investment funds and loss aversion. The results, which are based on the rebalancing changes shown in Table 5 , are presented in Table 6 . For the loss-tolerant employee, an investment of one 37 Alternatively, the comparisons in Table 6 can be viewed as the values, in present purchasing power, of an investment level that begins at $1 per year, and grows each year at the inflation rate. Purchasing power at the time of retirement would be lower due to the cumulative inflationary change in the price level. Also, their approach is based on application of the 1/n rule, rather than being optimized to an individual.
The Effects of Naïve Investment Strategies
Of course, few employees are likely to examine the results of portfolio optimization routines before investing, and even if they did, the future would not exactly replicate the history they studied. Also, most 403(b) plan sponsors are unwilling to provide investment advice because of concerns that doing so could be interpreted as taking investment control away from the participant, and increase the sponsor's legal exposure as a fiduciary.
So what happens if investors follow naïve strategies that ignore the historical empirical evidence? One way to examine this is to consider the effect of following an arbitrary rule-of-thumb investment approach. Several studies suggest that when employees are offered n investment choices, they will allocate their investment funds equally across those classes, and that they may not rebalance very often. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Liang and Weisbenner (2002) find that investors tend to use the 1/n rule. 39 As a result, the proportion invested in stocks depends on proportion of stocks in the fund. Generally, they find that the 1/n rule gets close to the frontier, but probably not at the right risk level. Brennan and Torous (1999) find that utility losses associated with being at the wrong place on the frontier can be large, a loss of utility of about 20 percent, based on a relative risk aversion coefficient of 2, a degree of risk aversion that is consistent with empirical findings for a representative investor.
To see the effects of the 1/n behavioral regularity, we computed the realized returns and standard deviations of applying the rule-of-thumb to our sample of funds. Table 7 reports expected annualized returns and standard deviations of the naïve strategy for opportunity sets including and excluding the TIAA Real Estate fund. Based on the historical data, expected return is lower and risk is higher when the TIAA Real Estate fund is not available. The more fundamental comparison shows that the 1/n allocation produces lower expected returns and lower risk when applied to TIAA-CREF Only, compared to the other alternatives. The differences in expected returns across menus are 39 Huberman and Jiang (2004) find that reliance on the 1/n strategy declines as the number of investment options increases. The median number of funds selected to invest in ranges from 3-4 regardless of the number of funds offered and the strategy tends to be followed once the funds have been selected. all less than one percent per year. One reason for the lower risk and return of TIAA-CREF Only, is that the relatively small number of funds places more weight on the CREF Money Market fund, which offers low expected returns and low risk.
The Cumulative Expected Returns panel of Table 7 shows expected long-run performance of the naïve strategy. Over time, the lower expected return to TIAA-CREF Only compounds to a substantial difference. Long-run values of the naïve strategy can be compared to projections at comparable risk levels in Figure 4 , which are based on optimized weightings. Compared to the results with omniscience, it is no surprise that the naïve strategy yields long-run results that are much lower.
Because application of the naïve strategy to the opportunity sets that include
Vanguard indexes yields both higher expected returns and higher risk, we also compare the downside performance of the alternative opportunity sets at one, two, and three It is important to recognize that these observations of preferences are based on strict adherence to the 1/n rule of thumb. An employee who had the TIAA-CREF + Vanguard opportunity set could, if desired, duplicate the TIAA-CREF Only profile simply by applying the 1/n rule only to TIAA-CREF funds.
Discussion
Because of recent changes to Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, colleges and universities that offer qualifying defined contribution retirement plans must make the plans universally available to their employees. Generally, this means that staff, custodians, physical plant workers, etc. will be participating in the same plans as professors who hold PhDs in economics and finance. Because the colleges and universities generally try to limit their fiduciary liability by ensuring that retirement investments are self-directed, the change, which merges people with radically different education backgrounds and expertise, poses serious issues for plan sponsors. Should the sponsor limit the number and risk of available investment options in order to protect unqualified employees from making investment mistakes? Or should the sponsor offer a broad menu of options so that more sophisticated employees will not suffer opportunity losses as a result of the inability to construct well-diversified portfolios that are at or near the efficient frontier and of appropriate risk for their personal situations? It appears that either course of action can subject the plan sponsor to greater fiduciary risk.
Currently, it appears that colleges and universities are moving in the direction of protecting themselves against the mistakes of unqualified employees by taking such actions as reducing the number of available asset classes and investment choices. In the short-run, if properly executed, this might be a good strategy, as lawsuits to recover actual losses are easier to bring than suits to recover the value of lost opportunities. On the other hand, the value of lost opportunities is likely to be much larger than the individual losses that arise from unskilled investment risk-taking, and the actual efforts of colleges and universities to protect against actual losses may increase the litigation risks that sponsors are seeking to avoid.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the opportunity cost of employers' decisions to restrict the investment choices for 403(b) retirement plan participants. We focus, in particular on TIAA-CREF, the manager that controls over half of all 403(b) assets and serves nearly half of the 6.8 million 403(b) participants. We find that over a recent eight-year period, the menu of choices available from TIAA-CREF substantially underperformed what could have been achieved by the addition of a small number of index funds. TIAA-CREF's underperformance during our sample period was due to the lack of key investment classes, most importantly, a value index, an international equity index, and a REIT index.
Because of these missing asset classes, we estimate that for a highly loss-averse sophisticated investor, having access to a set of equity indexes in addition to the TIAA-CREF menu would have increased the value of terminal wealth over a forty-year worklife by 72.4 percent. For a highly loss-averse unsophisticated investor, who simply allocated investments equally across all options, we estimate that access to the indexes would increase the value of terminal wealth by 26.3 percent. To put these figures on a macroeconomic scale, if all TIAA-CREF participants were restricted to use only TIAA-CREF over a forty-year horizon, our estimate of the terminal wealth loss is between $629 billion and $2.318 trillion, depending on the mix of investor sophistication levels. While the findings are specific to 403(b) retirement plans, the implications extend broadly to other defined contribution plans, including 401(k) plans, in which there are an estimated 37.1 million contributors, investing $134.7 billion annually.
Separate from the opportunity losses, we also find that restricting investment choices to those available from TIAA-CREF does not appear to reduce the risk of litigation based on actual losses. TIAA-CREF, though known for low fees, charges fees that are higher than those charged by large index funds managed by entities such as
Vanguard and Fidelity. Further, in our sample period, a TIAA-CREF fund had the highest total risk of any investment choice and the second lowest realized performance.
Given that TIAA-CREF's overall performance was worse than the portfolio of index funds during our sample period, one might surmise that the additional fees paid to TIAA-CREF were unwarranted and part of the actual losses that investors incurred.
While the focus of attention on ERISA compliance has been something of a bottom-up process, that seeks to avoid litigation exposure by trying to comply point by point with the provisions of the statute, a top-down approach would appear to be more meaningful. One attorney who works in the area proposes to focus on intent. He asks:
"What is the intended purpose of ERISA? The obvious and only plausible answer is, the objective of the law is that every participant's account should be well-invested."
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From this perspective, the one-size-does-not-fit-all approach does not appear to work very well. Another possible approach may be to offer a narrow set of fairly welldiversified investment options plus enable participants to access a broader menu of options through a self-directed brokerage or mutual fund window. These brokerage or window accounts allow participants to invest in mutual funds, and possibly individual 42 Table 3 Figure 3
Portfolio Risk as a Percent of the Average Risk of Each Fund in the Portfolio
Risk is measured as annualized standard deviation of the portfolio and is expressed as a percent of the average standard deviation of the funds comprising the portfolio. Figure 4 Figure 5 Table 4 Table 5 Optimal portfolios given risk aversion are determined by investment horizon and tolerance of value at risk. The one-sigma weights correspond to VAR of 16 percent, the two-sigma weights correspond to VAR of 2.5 percent, and the three sigma weights correspond to VAR of 0.1 percent. The assumption of $1 per year is equivalent to the alternative assumption of one dollar invested the first year, with annual contributions increasing at the inflation rate, and with table values being stated in present dollar at the time of the initial investment. Table 7 
